This text is the "introduction" to the book *Postwar and Falange: Arrese, Secretary General of FET y de las JONS (1941–1945)*, by the historian Joan Maria Thomàs.
This book is based on unpublished archival documentation belonging to José Luis de Arrese Magra, who served as Minister-Secretary General of the Francoist regime’s single party—the *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS*—during the first of his two terms in that role, between 1941 and 1945. These were the years in which he consolidated the party as an instrument of the regime—a party that remained permanently submissive and faithful to its "national faith"—that is, to Franco himself—until its dissolution in 1977, two months before the first democratic elections. By that time, it had long been known as the "National Movement." Arrese did not create what we might call "Franco’s Falange," but he strengthened and firmly cemented its role as the organized civilian foundation of the regime and its *Caudillo*—the "National Chief."
Arrese’s tenure has already been examined in its broad outlines by authors such as Mercedes Peñalba and Álvaro de Diego; therefore, this book does not aim to provide an exhaustive or systematic analysis. Nor is it a history of the *FET y de las JONS* or its General Secretariat during the four years of Arrese’s first term as minister. Instead, I will explain what Arrese envisioned for the Francoist Falange during this period, specifically regarding the new impetus he gave to the "de-fascistization" of the party and its ideology. Furthermore, I will shed light on aspects of the party’s internal life—as well as that of the Francoist "New State"—that have remained largely or entirely unknown. These insights primarily concern the internal political dynamics of both the single party and the authoritarian coalition that supported Franco at the height of his power.
For the 1941–1945 period, I will examine issues related to the ruling party and how its members exercised "command" wherever they held authority, as well as the structural violence they employed—a practice that was, in effect, part of the party’s DNA. aspects of his populism—presenting himself as the authentic and sole representative "of the people," while at times proposing "social" measures (whether genuine or merely apparent) amidst a landscape of desolation, hunger, and deprivation for the majority of that very same populace; his drive and determination to achieve political hegemony over other factions within the Francoist camp—a goal he would never attain; and his profound political opportunism, already evident in his largely submissive acceptance of the Unification decree of April 19, 1937, and the initial, partial "de-fascistization" it entailed—a process that would continue, further evolving under the "Arresismo" period. And, above all, there was the overarching factor that shaped everything else: the messianic political vision of the Falange—the conviction that the movement played a vital, preeminent role as the sole source of a doctrine capable of bringing Spain to its full potential, under the leadership of a Francoist "national chief," with Arrese himself effectively assuming the mantle of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Nothing less.
Arrese began his ministerial tenure in May 1941, finding himself in conflict with Ramón Serrano Suñer—Franco’s brother-in-law and, until recently, his primary political advisor. Franco was already contemplating dispensing with Serrano’s services, though it would ultimately take him more than a year to do so. The struggle was effectively won by Arrese, thanks to the support of the Head of State; Serrano had become an increasingly burdensome liability, owing to his arrogance and his private conduct—the latter escalating into a public scandal within the highest echelons of the regime and even within the dictator’s own family.
Arrese became the *Generalísimo*’s chief advisor on party affairs. He also became a close confidant—though his relationship with Franco differed in nature from that of the other key political advisor, Luis Carrero Blanco, who also assumed his role in May 1941 as Undersecretary of the Presidency of the Government. From his position, he consistently sought to transcend the scope of his formal authority, taking it upon himself—whether on his own initiative, in collaboration with subordinates, or by involving himself in the work of other ministers—to draft foundational laws for the Regime, as well as other provisions that fell well outside the strict purview of the FET y de las JONS. He often felt no qualms about claiming authorship of all these documents.
His justification for this always rested on the (theoretical) role that the Regime’s foundational texts assigned to the single party: that of a "militant movement" serving as the inspiration for, and the very foundation of, the Spanish State.
His (initial) downfall came in 1945. For two years, he had been taking steps to "de-fascistize" the regime—a response to an international climate that had turned hostile—while simultaneously developing his own specific interpretation of Falangist ideology. Yet, Franco—who was far less ideologically constrained and had already decided to obscure or disguise the more overtly fascist elements of the new order—dismissed him from his post as Minister-Secretary General. This occurred in the wake of the Second World War, which saw the defeat of the fascist regimes—a development that posed a grave danger to a Spain that had been closely aligned with the Axis powers.
However, the fact that the *Caudillo* took these measures did not imply the abolition of the single party—neither then nor ever. And therein lies, precisely, the primary achievement of Arrese’s first ministerial tenure—as well as that of his predecessors since the Unification of 1937: he helped foster a loyalty among the Falangist masses toward their National Leader, Franco—a loyalty so profound that they would never wish to dispense with the organization, the FET y de las JONS, which served as the bedrock of their unwavering allegiance. This stood in contrast to other sectors—such as the *Juanista* or Carlist monarchists, or certain army generals—whose support could, at times, be ambiguous, or who were more or less openly inclined toward a monarchical restoration (particularly the *Juanista* option, which held the most significant influence), viewing it as the ultimate solution. For its part, the single party further solidified its loyalty to Franco, who had become its sole guarantee of survival as an organization.
The selection of materials from the Arrese Archive that I have utilized for this book follows the lines indicated above and is not exhaustive. To have attempted a comprehensive survey would have required many more years of work, given the vast scale of the documentary collection under study. It is an immense archive—the most significant collection of Falangist documentation currently in private hands—and, in terms of scope, it is second only to the General Archive of the Administration (*Archivo General de la Administración*), which houses the surviving public records of the FET y de las JONS—that is, those that were not destroyed. In the case at hand, there was also a risk that the documentation might be lost; its preservation is due both to the willingness and generosity of the individual’s nephew and heir, José Miguel de Arrese García Monsalve, and his wife, María Victoria García Bueno, and to the persistent efforts of the team of archivists at the General Archive (in collaboration with the University of Navarra) to make the collection accessible to researchers.
The collections that comprise the archive were classified and organized by Arrese himself in the decades following his final departure from ministerial office—a period that includes the nine years (up to 1986) he lived after the end of the Francoist era in 1977. For the period examined in the book, the archive contains documentation generated during his time in political office. It includes a wealth of files on various subjects, such as reports or letters written to—or addressed to—Franco; notes sent to other ministers during cabinet meetings; drafts of legislation; personal assessments of Falangists and Francoists; accounts of incidents involving Falangists, as well as instances of corruption among them; correspondence with the party’s provincial leaders and civil governors; and reports on labor disputes or public order issues. These materials are of great interest for understanding the history of the single party, the authoritarian Francoist coalition, and the regime as a whole, viewed from an internal perspective.
Por otra parte, la colección entregada a AGUN no contiene documentación de carácter personal o familiar de Arrese, ni sobre sus estudios, relaciones, amistades, trabajo profesional, etc., incluyendo su (supuesta) etapa como falangista en la primera hora o, ya durante la Guerra Civil, documentación que hace referencia a su persecución y condena como condena como condena algunas excepciones – ni durante el resto del conflicto hasta su primer acceso a una posición franquista – el Gobierno Civil y la sede provincial del partido en Málaga en 1939 – poco menos de dos años después de su liberación de la cárcel –hospital penitenciario provincial, más bien – después de su condena por los Eventos de Salamanca de abril de 1937
It appears that these records—or at least the portion that may have actually existed—were never donated by the family to the archive. This has severely limited the scope for new biographical insights beyond what has already been published about the individual—including his own accounts of his career (with the exception of material already known from the General Military Archive in Ávila, which he helped summarize). Furthermore, it is somewhat surprising that Arrese possessed documentation from the FE de las JONS dating back to the Republican era, yet no records survive from the Civil War period—the very time leading up to the party’s dissolution and subsequent absorption into the new FET y de las JONS. It is possible that some of the early officials within the FE organization handed these materials over to him, or to the General Secretariat, during his tenure as its leader.
Based on an examination of collections directly related to Arrese’s political career and administrative work—as well as his own autobiographical writings—it can be inferred that he, like many public figures concerned with their legacy, likely curated his personal papers and mementos to construct a narrative free of blemishes or moral ambiguity.
Arrese was well aware that his political career contained episodes that could tarnish or complicate the image he had long cultivated—an image he sought to project through his extensive body of written work. He wished to be remembered as a significant political figure: a close doctrinal collaborator of José Antonio Primo de Rivera (the founder of the Falange, who was executed by a popular tribunal and to whom Arrese was related by marriage), and the architect of an original body of thought—a man who, at great personal sacrifice, dedicated his life to the service of the Regime and of Franco. He was a Falangist of the "old guard"—a member from the very inception of this fascist organization—who possessed a deep understanding of its founder’s character and thought. Above all, he was capable of interpreting that thought, not only in the period following the Civil War and throughout much of the regime’s existence, but even during the Falange’s early phase, when it held unquestionable legitimacy and authority.
Setting aside the narrative he constructed for himself, the reality is that Arrese was a significant and influential Minister-Secretary of the FET y las JONS. As an administrator of the single party, he was able to reorganize and strengthen it by linking its leadership more directly to that of the *Caudillo*, Francisco Franco—thereby ending the role Serrano Suñer had played as an intermediary between the party and the Head of State, and taking that position for himself. He was a leader who succeeded in consolidating the Falange as an organization fiercely loyal to the *Caudillo*. Furthermore, he took bold, highly visible steps to "de-Falangize" the movement’s doctrine—continuing a process that had begun after the 1937 Unification—by promoting his own personal interpretation of the ideology and program originally developed by Antonio Primo de Rivera before the Civil War. He pursued this agenda from the moment he took charge of the General Secretariat, and even more so after the tide of the Second World War began to turn in 1943.
While he was not the only figure working toward this "de-Falangization," he enjoyed the greatest visibility, thanks to the position he held and the official propaganda resources at his disposal—including the publication of his books by party- or regime-affiliated presses, the mass dissemination of his speeches and articles, and even the translation of one of his works into English.
The objectives of this new "de-fascistizing" shift—alongside Catholicism and anti-communism—included (ostensibly) anti-totalitarianism and a distancing from a form of "fascism" now portrayed as "foreign" and (presumably) unrelated to Falangism; all of this was rooted in the thought of José Antonio [Primo de Rivera]. Yet, this doctrinal "de-fascistization" was entirely compatible with maintaining a political project that continued to aspire to the hegemony of the party—or "Movement"—within the Regime. Consequently, this process unfolded while the effort persisted to ensure that Falangist doctrine and its adherents permeated the Regime’s institutional structure and political life at every level.
In other words, the project Arrese undertook—aimed at stripping away everything he deemed "external" or "unoriginal" to Falangism—went hand in hand with his attempt to colonize the Regime with Falangist doctrine. While he did not initiate this endeavor, he sought to expand it following the issuance of "Decree 9"—an ambition that was, in essence, purely totalitarian.
Beyond the party’s reach, Arrese’s doctrinal and legislative initiatives—as well as his efforts toward institutionalization—sparked growing concern among other factions within Franco’s authoritarian coalition. This anxiety intensified as the Second World War drew to a close, culminating in the defeat of fascism—a defeat that, by all indications, threatened the Regime’s survival. This unease led various components of the coalition to explore political alternatives that challenged the existence of the single-party system—and even the Regime itself—by proposing a monarchist restoration, a path that encompassed several different tendencies and potential candidates. Arrese reacted with all his might, convinced that he had to do so as the top leader of a party in charge of developing the political doctrine of the Regime, demanding a firm hand against "desertions", tolerating or protecting squadist - violent fascist - actions of the party in the streets, while offering a program of adaptation of the Regime.
A program that included the new measures defeixistes esmentades o fins and all the promotion (in a very strange way) of monarchical candidates alternating to Juanism and to intransigent Carlism. There was also an effort to ensure the Falangist political space within the Regime. In the end, he would be the destitute, but neither the Juanist nor the Carlist monarchy arrived. Neither the FET nor the JONS are suppressed, but remain semi-hidden for some time. And here there is a certain merit of the character together with Franco's desire not to dispense with the main base of civil power organization. Arrese's promotions over the FET are also maintained for many years, which would facilitate his return to the Ministry of the General Secretary of the Movement in 1956.
Joan Maria Thomàs, August 2023
Joan Mª Thomàs, Historian, University Professor
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